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In the 1970s advances in genetics raised the possibility of adding recombinant DNA (or “gene splicing”) 
techniques to the array of methods used by breeders to develop new varieties of plants.  Recombinant 
DNA technology involves isolating the fragments of DNA expressing the genes that carry a desired 
characteristic in one plant or variety of plant, splitting the DNA molecule of another variety or plant with 
other desired characteristics, combining the two partial DNA molecules into a single new DNA molecule, 
and then inserting that new DNA molecule into a cell and providing appropriate conditions in a lab that will 
enable that new recombinant DNA (rDNA) molecule to replicate.  If replication is successful, the cells with 
the rDNA can then be used to grow a new variety of plant with tissue culture methods identical to those 
used by traditional hybridizers.  Though the goal, development of hybrid plants or animals combining the 
desirable characteristics of two or more “parent” varieties, is similar to that of traditional cross-breeding 
through grafting of plants or artificial insemination of animals, the process was unproven.  In addition, some 
of the prospects described by gene splicing enthusiasts inspired fears among other observers that 
recombinant DNA techniques could result in the breeding of very pernicious varieties.  While traditional 
hybridizing and artificial insemination techniques can be applied only to plants or animals that will cross-
breed as whole organisms, recombinant DNA techniques can by-pass that limit, and observers who believe 
the natural barriers to cross-breeding are part of nature’s defense against evolution of dangerous varieties 
looked with dismay at the prospect of jumping over that barrier. 
 
General Considerations informing Policy Decisions 
 
Policy decisions in scientific and engineering fields have a factual and a normative component.  The factual 





normative component consists of the principles and values and principles that policy-makers or citizens 
believe will guide them to a good decision.  The intensity of policy debate about a particular matter is 
related to both the level of uncertainty in scientific or technical knowledge about the matter and the level of 
ethical concern.  The possible variation in intensity can be suggested by a nine-cell matrix: 
 
 
 level of knowledge uncertainty 
 high medium low 
high    
medium    
 
level of ethical 
concern 
low    
 
 
Knowledge uncertainty can take any of several forms; each of them makes choosing policies difficult 
because uncertainty reduces ability to foresee the full consequences of any policy choice.  The first, and 
most fundamental, form of uncertainty is lack of knowledge regarding the basic cause-effect relationships 
among physical phenomena.  When causal knowledge is missing, people cannot anticipate how changing 
some aspect of a physical situation (for example, releasing chlorofluorocarbons [CFCs] into the 
atmosphere) will affect other aspects (the chemical composition of the atmosphere, the thickness of any 
particular layer of the atmosphere).  When CFCs were first invented, they were regarded as 
environmentally superior to earlier refrigerants because the earlier ones sometimes exploded while CFCs 
are inert at ground level.  Only in the late 1960s and early 1970s was the connection between CFC 
emissions and depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer understood.  A milder form of uncertainty, also 
inhibiting good policy choices, exists when the basic causal relations are understood but the intensity of the 
relation between cause and effect cannot be estimated very precisely.  In the 1970s and 1980s many 
people agreed that carbon dioxide and other gaseous emissions were altering the chemical composition of 
the atmosphere, but there was still considerable disagreement among experts about what amount of 
change in average temperature of the atmosphere would affect weather patterns around the world.  A third 
form of uncertainty exists when both the basic causal mechanism and the intensity of cause-effect relation 
are understood but it is not clear how to ensure desirable changes or prevent undesirable ones.  In the late 
1960s, many people thought that banning use of CFCs as aerosol propellant (as in deodorants or spray 
paint) would prevent further damage to the stratospheric ozone layer; only in the mid 1970s was it fully 
understood that refrigeration uses would have to be ended as well because the small amounts of CFCs 
escaping from each refrigerator added up globally to significant emissions. 
 
Ethical concern can focus on people or on nature.  Traditionally, ethics focused on the impact of one 
person’s actions on other persons, with ethicists, philosophers, and others debating questions like avoiding 
harm to others, ensuring fairness or justice, and how far one person may enjoy freedom from limits on 
choice or action.  Since the late 1960s increasing attention has been devoted to the impact of human 
activity on nature, and considerable ethical discussion of humans’ obligations to future generations of 
humans (intergenerational equity), to other species of life (animal welfare or animal rights) or to nature as a 





ethical concern surrounding an issue rests on a combination of its perceived importance to the well-being of 
humans and/or nature and on the level of consensus regarding the values that should guide policy choices 
and human actions on the matter. 
 
Scientific uncertainty and ethical concern converge in the process of defining what action is “safe.”  Even 
when the risk (the likelihood that a negative impact of a particular magnitude will occur) can be specified 
fairly clearly, different individuals, groups, and societies may react differently, one deciding the risk is 
tolerable and hence that undertaking the activity is safe (at least as long as those doing so are reasonably 
prudent), and another deciding that the risk is too high and hence undertaking the activity is not safe.  
When lack of knowledge of the likelihood and intensity of some impact is great enough that people can 
insist that the probability of harm is high and its intensity very strong, there will be particularly strong 
pressures to define the activity as unsafe.  
 
Genetically Modified Organisms 
 
Genetic modification of organisms and plants involves identifying genes that carry desirable traits (such as 
pest resistance, disease resistance, or higher nutritional content), developing recombinant DNA (rDNA) 
containing the genes carrying the desired trait, and using that rDNA to breed a new variety of the organism 
or plant that will have the trait.  Genetically modified (“GM”) organisms, plants, animal feeds, and human 
foods inspire heated debate today because they involve both high knowledge uncertainty and high ethical 
concern.  The knowledge uncertainty is focused primarily on the impact of introducing GM organisms, 
plants, feeds, or foods into fields and food supplies on humans, other varieties of animal or plant life, and 
the natural environment more generally.  Perceptions of likely impact range from minimal – GM foods, 
though produced by new technology, pose no greater risk to ecosystems and living beings than new 
varieties of plants or animals developed with traditional techniques of grafting or selective breeding whole 
organisms – to maximal – GM organisms are so different from varieties developed with traditional 
techniques that they will unbalance the natural environment.  Adding to the confusion, the maximal harm 
scenarios come in two varieties.  In the first, GM organisms either displace natural varieties or combine with 
them to produce destructive organisms (the “frankenfood” scenario) that crowd out others.  In the second, 
GM organisms and plants prove so genetically identical that they can be eliminated by some disease the 
developers did not consider and wide adoption leaves food supplies extremely vulnerable to sudden 
collapse (the starvation from loss of genetic diversity scenario). 
 
In recent years, the situation has become more fluid as gene insertion techniques have been applied to 
“cisgenic” as well as “transgenic” rDNA.  Transgenic rDNA contains genes spliced out from different 
species that would not cross-breed naturally with the species being improved, and this feature of crossing 
natural barriers to inter-breeding inspired much of the concern about environmental effects of GM 
organisms and plants.  “Cisgenic” rDNA is developed from organisms or plants closely enough related to 
one another that they would cross-breed naturally.  Using cisgenic rDNA rather than traditional cross-
breeding of whole organisms allows developers to select only the gene carrying a desired trait, whereas 
traditional cross-breeding involves taking up the entire gene sequence.  Thus, for example, a conventional 





use wild varieties that also carry genes that express toxic compounds like glyco-alkaloids.  The undesired 
trait must then be removed by a process of back-crossing over several generations until a hybrid is 
developed that has the desired trait (disease-resistance) without the undesired one (glycol-alkaloids).  Back 
crossing can be a lengthy process, whereas cisgenic rDNA produces a desired variety in a single 
generation. 
 
High ethical concern about GM organisms has two sources:  concerns for the integrity and sustainability of 
the natural environment and concern about the social consequences of allowing the supply of seeds or 
breeding stock to be controlled by developers (mainly thought not exclusively very large multinational 
corporations) having 20-year monopolies over distribution of any particular genetic material, seed, or 
animal breeding stock as a consequence of patent rights. 
 
Sources of EU-US Divergence 
 
In debates over GM organisms, scientific uncertainty and ethical concern have played out differently in the 
European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA) since the mid 1990s for institutional and 
ideational reasons.  The US regulatory system is centralized for rule-making, with regulatory authority held 
by three government agencies – the Food and Drug Administration (food safety), the Department of 
Agriculture (planting of GM crops), and the Environmental Protection Agency (use of GM technology to 
create pest resistance in plants) but decentralized for rule-enforcement in that individuals, groups, firms or 
large sets of individuals can bring a tort suit against a developer or seller of GM seeds or plants or products 
made from GM plants and US law allows assessing of high financial penalties for damage.  The EU 
regulatory system is decentralized in rule-making, with the EU Commission and EU agencies co-existing 
with national agencies but more centralized in rule-enforcement because the civil law systems of 
continental European states do not make provision for private tort suits.1  While in some areas the US 
federal government and the governments of the 50 states of the union contend over their spheres of 
authority, federal authority to regulate the development and use of GM technology clearly prevails.  In the 
EU, ongoing struggles for authority between the EU Commission (the supranational body in charge of 
developing draft regulations) and the EU Council and European Parliament (the representative bodies of 
member governments and of national populations respectively with the power to adopt regulations) as well 
as between EU agencies and national government agencies creates more veto points in the decision-
making processes regarding GM technology than exist in the USA because neither Congress not the courts 
have been involved in any sustained way with debates about use of GM technology.  
 
These institutional differences have less practical impact when EU and US approaches to regulation are 
less divergent; the two have been able to develop common regulations on a wide range of technical, 
                                                
1 Legal differences noted in Mark A. Pollock and Gregory C. Schaffer. 2009.  When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and 
Politics of Genetically Modified Foods (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 53.  As they point out, “This difference in the 
operation of US and European legal systems is often forgotten in political and sociological assessments of their different 






economic, and health matters.2  However, in the mid 1990s European attitudes toward GM foods, animal 
feeds, and crops diverged significantly from US attitudes.  The Reagan Administration set the basic 
parameters of US policy in 1986 in laying out the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of 
Biotechnology.  This encouraged the approach formalized in 1992 under which the US agencies treated 
genetic modification as another form of breeding and focused on whether a particular product of GM 
technology is safe.  Partly because of pressures from conservatives and business interests, US regulatory 
approaches rely heavily quantifiable estimates of potential harms and benefits used to make cost-benefit 
analyses.  Though initially inclined to treat GM organisms as similar, the EU and most of its member states 
now regard genetically modified organisms, plants, feeds, and foods as very different from “conventional” 
varieties developed with traditional cross-breeding and hybridization techniques because GM technology 
allows combining genes across species of plants or animals.  This focus on the technology as 
fundamentally different encourages rejection of cost-benefit analysis in favor of regarding the area as one 
so full of uncertainty that the EU’s preference for relying on the precautionary principle in matters having 
environmental implications should apply.  This principle mandates avoiding a new activity or technology 
while its long-term consequences remain unknown, and taking it up only after the best available 
assessment techniques show that there will be only low and reversible negative impact on the environment 
and particular life forms.  Thus US regulatory agencies regard genetically modified organisms, plants, 
feeds, and foods as “substantially equivalent” to varieties produced by traditional breeding methods unless 
there is solid proof of a significant difference while European ones assume there is a substantial difference.  
Nor does the USA rely as extensively on the precautionary principle; most of its policy decisions are still 
guided by the traditional rule that a new activity may proceed until it is shown to cause significant harm. 
 
These differing presuppositions result in very deep differences of regulatory approach on the two sides of 
the Atlantic.  The basic US government decision that GM plants, animal feeds, and human foods are 
essentially similar to conventionally-bred plants, feeds, and foods requires regulators to demonstrate that 
they are notably less safe for planting or consumption before they can block cultivation or sale.  In the EU, 
a largely opposite dynamic has prevailed since late 1998.  European rules start from the proposition that 
GM plants, feeds, and foods are significantly different from conventionally bred ones and those who want to 
plant or sell them must prove to regulatory agencies that their plant, feed, or food is safe.  The different 
orientations also affect policies towards GM organisms already in the environment: the EU requires more 
continued monitoring of effects than does the USA. 
 
Origins of the Divergence 
 
In the late 1980s, before the regulatory differences developed, business leaders and policy-makers in the 
EU and the USA agreed that coordinating their policy approaches in a range regulatory policy areas would 
be helpful to both industry and consumers.  In 1995 European and American business leaders created the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) to push for the liberalization and harmonization of laws and 
                                                
2See, for examples, George Bermann, Matthias Herdegen, and Peter Lindstreth, eds.  2001 Transatlantic Regulatory 
Cooperation: Legal Problems and Political Prospects (New York: Oxford University Press); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Mark A. 
Pollack, eds. 2003.  Transatlantic Economic Disputes: The US, the EU, and the WTO (New York: Oxford University Press); 
David Andrews, Mark A. Pollack, Gregory Schaffer, and Helen Wallace, eds. 2005. The Future of Transatlantic Economic 





regulations regarding highly-traded goods and services on both continents.  From its beginnings the TABD 
urged the United States and the European Union to adhere to a shared policy on genetically modified food.  
Its recommendations were forwarded to the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP), an EU-US 
governmental working group charged with developing draft common policies.  In 1998 the TEP created a 
Biotechnology Working Group that attempted to launch a project that would have created a process for 
simultaneous regulation of particular GMOs on both sides of the Atlantic.   
 
The original EU rules adopted in Directive 90/220 of 1990 were very similar to the US rules, so prospects 
for agreeing on a common set of rules and a parallel regulatory process looked very good.  Before the 
TEP’s project got underway, however, the prospects for success were undermined by food safety scares 
and the rise of anti-genetically modified food protests in Europe that sent the EU policy process in a 
different direction.  Though relating to conventionally bred plants and animals, the scare about humans 
contracting bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow disease”) from English beef in 1996 and 
the discoveries of toxic materials in Belgian and French animal feedstocks in 1999,3 reduced public 
confidence in EU and national regulators just as anti-GMO campaigns were taking off.  US biotech firms 
were aware of the sentiments, and Monsanto sought in vain to counter them with public relations 
campaigns that, by suggesting critics were irrational and anti-science, only strengthened opposition by 
allowing environmental groups to present the GM controversy as one of embattled civil society groups up 
against, but ultimately overcoming, large foreign multinational corporations.  All agricultural applications of 
GM technology were cast into doubt as environmentalists deployed a combination of worst-case scenarios 
about environmental damage, fears about eating foods containing ingredients with unknown health 
consequences, and arguments that GM technology benefits mainly those engaged in large-scale 
environmentally-damaging “industrial” farming so hurts poorer farmers to raise very effective technical and 
ethical concerns. 
 
The government of Austria led the way to policy divergence in February 1997 by invoking the 1990 
Directive’s Article 16 “safeguard clause” that allowed member states to ban growing plants from particular 
GM seeds if they judge that growing them will threaten the country’s environment even if EU regulatory 
authorities have accepted them as safe.  Austria’s decision to ban BT 176 maize (corn) developed by 
Novartis, inspired other governments to take similar decisions; between 1997 and 2000, six-member 
countries – Austria, Luxembourg, France, Greece, Italy, and Germany – had invoked the safeguard clause 
on 12 occasions to ban particular plants.  Opponents of using GM technology claimed that Directive 90/220 
was too vague and the approval process lacked sufficiently stringent risk assessment requirements, and 
their positions garnered substantial public support.  In 1998-99 some major European food processors – 
Danone, Nestle, and Unilever – and some supermarket chains – including Sainsbury’s in the UK and  
Carrefour in France – announced they would not use or sell products containing GM ingredients.  
Responding to the general public discontent, and hoping to ward off further member government use of 
safeguards, the European Commission announced on 26 November 1997 that it would amend Directive 
90/220 to address the concerns of its member states and issue no further approvals of GM plants or 
products until the new regulations were in place.  This course of action was reaffirmed in June 1999 when 
the EU Council outlined its thinking on a new, more restrictive regulatory scheme including tougher safety 
                                                





criteria and requiring authorizations to plant or sell be renewed every 10 years.  Previously issued permits 
remained valid, but strong consumer resistance meant that sales of GM seeds and GM-containing feeds 
and foods fell drastically.  The value of American GM corn exports to EU countries fell from around $211 
million in 1997 to $200,000 in 2005; similarly, GM soybean exports fell from $2.3 billion in 1997 to $511 
million in 2005.   
 
Reinforcement of the Divergence 
 
While developing its regulations, the EU also participated actively in the multilateral negotiations leading to 
conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in January 2000.  Enough countries then ratified the 
Protocol for it to enter into force and provide binding rules for the countries accepting it.  The Protocol does 
not affect national regulations, though it does reinforce the right of each country to make its own regulations 
and ensure that any seeds, plantstocks, or agricultural products imported into its territory meet its 
regulatory requirements through what international lawyers call a “prior informed consent regime.”  The 
Protocol requires exporters of GM organisms to provide information about the organisms they want to send 
to other countries and get express approval from the importing country’s government before trade 
proceeds.  The importing country government can require a risk assessment if none is available, and also 
that the exporter absorb the costs of performing the risk assessment.  Any agricultural commodities (raw 
materials like cotton as well as animal feeds and human foods) that contain GMOs must be accompanied 
by documentation indicating the shipment “may contain” GMOs.  Governments must also post information 
about their regulations, approvals they have granted, and risk assessments they have done or had others 
do on a central Internet site maintained by the international Biosafety Clearing-House.4  This helps 
governments, importers, and exporters by giving them “one-stop shopping” for the information they need to 
operate the prior informed consent regime.  The US government has not accepted the Protocol, but the 147 
of the world’s 196 independent states that have – which include all members of the EU and major importers 
of agricultural products like China, Egypt, India, and Japan, and many African counties importing food or 
receiving food aid – can invoke it to require any private company or person seeking to export GMOs to 
comply with the rules it establishes.  This follows from the traditional international law principle that each 
state has control over activity on its territory, and once goods shipped from one country as exports arrive 
reach their destination at a port or airport of another, they become imports subject to that state’s control. 
 
Article 1 of the Biosafety Protocol contains a clear endorsement of the precautionary principle: 
In accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, the objective of this Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level 
of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from 
modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary 
movements. 
 
Article 2, the General Provisions, strongly endorse the right of each country to make its own decisions.   
 
                                                





Paragraph 2 specifies that: 
The Parties shall ensure that the development, handling, transport, use, transfer and release of any 
living modified organisms are undertaken in a manner that prevents or reduces the risks to 
biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health.  
 
Paragraph 4 says that: 
Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as restricting the right of a Party to take action that is 
more protective of the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity than that called for in 
this Protocol, provided that such action is consistent with the objective and the provisions of this 
Protocol and is in accordance with that Party's other obligations under international law. 
 
All of these provisions reinforce the European stance that GM technology poses significant risks and so are 
not to be used before a very thorough prior assessment, and challenge the US stance that GM organisms 
are basically safe so may be used unless proven otherwise.5 
 
Though the EU adopted its new regulations in 2001 and 2003, it did not start considering new approvals of 
growing GM crops or selling foods or feeds containing GM material because public opposition to GM foods 
remained very strong.  US firms and food distributors, who believed their products were both safe and 
beneficial, were irritated by what they saw as an intentional move to keep the moratorium in place even 
though the new policies had been adopted.  Many of them also thought the EU was using public opinion as 
a smokescreen for policies actually meant to protect European seed companies, farmers, and food 
wholesalers from foreign competition.  Such suspicion was not entirely unreasonable; the EU has a long 
record of maintaining particularly high trade barriers against foreign agricultural and food products.  Yet, 
even the George W. Bush administration, one well known for its partiality to the interests of big business 
and the well-organized agricultural groups, was reluctant to confront the issue head-on until May 2003.  By 
then, the extent of anti-GMO sentiment among both the US and European public appeared stable and 
unlikely to be increase the publicity attending a trade dispute.  More important to US decision-makers, third 
countries were defining their attitudes towards GMOs, with some becoming highly restrictive, and US 
companies and growers’ associations were pressing the government to head that off.6 
 
The WTO Complaint 
 
On 13 May 2003, the United States, Canada and Argentina filed complaints with the World Trade 
Organization contending that the European Union – referred to in the complaint as the European 
Community – moratorium on approving new genetically modified food amounted to unfair protectionist 
measures against their countries’ GM products, actions they contended were prohibited by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).7  However, they carefully confined their complaint to procedural 
                                                
5Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  Text available at http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/protocol.shtml (accessed 17 June 2010). 
 
6 Factors influencing the timing and form of the US complaints are discussed at length in Pollack and Schaffer 2009, pp. 179-
182. 
 





issues rather than challenging the EU’s basic regulatory framework or the substance of its regulations.  The 
complainants’ main arguments were that neither the “de facto general moratorium” on approving any 
additional GM plants for growth or sale not the Commission’s failure to approve GM varieties that the 
European Food Safety Agency had agreed were safe were based on scientific evidence or an appropriate 
risk assessment as required by the WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS).  While attempts to end the moratorium was arguably the most important single element of 
the complaints, the three countries also objected to six EU member states’ – Austria, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy and Luxembourg - use of the EU “safeguard clause” to prohibit imports of certain GMOs 
and/or maintain product-specific moratoriums.  
 
The EU response emphasized two points.  The EU argued, first, that it never adopted a formal moratorium 
on the approval of new GM crops, and cited its May 2004 approval of the Bt-11 variety of sweet corn as 
evidence that a blanket ban on new GM products never existed, and that each case was decided on its 
own merits.  Second, the EU also argued that the SPS Agreement did not adequately address the 
complexities of the GM food case by itself, so other international agreements, such as the 1992 Convention 
on Biological Diversity and its 2003 Protocol on Biosafety, that do address those complexities should also 
guide interpretation of obligations under GATT.  It contended in particular that the 2003 Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety – to which the EU, but not the United States, Canada, or Argentina is a party – permits states 
to adopt a precautionary approach toward products created by application of new technologies. 
 
After the required “consultations” between the EU and each of the complaining states failed to resolve the 
dispute; the matter went to a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel.  While the USA, Canada, and Argentina had 
made separate complaints (WT/DS291, WT/DS292, and WT/DS293 respectively) all three were assigned 
to one Dispute Settlement Panel because of their similarity.  Unlike the previous GATT Dispute Settlement 
Process, where the veto-power of individual member states forced panels to reach decisions all member 
states would accept, the WTO Dispute Settlement Process requires consensus among all parties for 
rejection of a Panel’s report.  This rule establishes a presumption in favor of accepting the Panel Report, 
effectively transferring decision authority from the Dispute Settlement Body composed or representatives of 
the member states to the Dispute Settlement Panels and, if any of the disputants is unhappy enough with 
the Panel’s decision to seek a review, to the Appellate Board. 
 
The three-member WTO Panel began hearing oral arguments in June 2004.  Five states, Australia, Chile, 
China, New Zealand, and Norway, filed memoranda as third parties to the case.  Australia and Chile laid 
out largely neutral arguments in support of third parties’ and developing countries’ rights to file memoranda 
on WTO disputes as third parties.  China and Norway filed arguments supporting the EU’s position, while 
New Zealand supported the complainants’ position.  The Panel also accepted briefs from three 
nongovernmental entities that urged it to rule that the EU’s regulations were consistent with trade law, but 






The Dispute Settlement Panel’s September 2006 final report8 ruled that the EU’s pre-market approval 
system for GM products violated the SPS Agreement provision prohibiting unnecessary delays.  The Panel 
concluded that “the European Communities applied a general de facto moratorium on approvals of biotech 
products between June 1999 and 29 August 2003” and set a date of 21 November 2007 for the EU to lift its 
moratorium on the approval of GM products, or risk facing WTO sanctions.  In addition, the Panel 
recommended to the Dispute Settlement Body that it request the European Commission to finish the 
approval process of GMOs stuck in legal limbo.  The Panel requested that the Dispute Settlement Body 
require member states with national safeguard measures in place bring their laws into accordance with 
WTO regulations.  The EU had contended that the GATT and the SPS Agreement, adopted in 1994, should 
be read in light of the later Cartagena Protocol and its institutionalization of the precautionary principle used 
to interpret what measures are allowed under the SPS Agreement.  Argentina, Canada, and the USA 
contended that the SPS Agreement should be read on its own terms, not in light of a different agreement.  
The Panel avoided the question by declaring neither the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety nor the 
Convention on Biological Diversity were pertinent to the dispute before it because some of the countries 
involved in the dispute were not parties to those agreements.  This is consistent with the international law 
rule that states are bound only by rules to which they have given consent, either expressly (as by ratifying a 
treaty) or tacitly (as by using the rule to justify their own actions). 
 
While the ruling could be interpreted as a victory for pro-GM interests, the Dispute Settlement Panel did not 
state any opinions that would prevent the EU from continuing to develop stricter regulations than prevail in 
the USA and other countries.  The Panel focused closely on the questions before it, and consistent with 
good adjudication practice, did not rule on extraneous questions or make a broad statement when a narrow 
one would settle a point in dispute.  Thus, the Final Report did not address the legality of the pre-market 
approval, and risk assessment procedures ultimately adopted by the EU, and in particular, avoided 
specifying whether the precautionary principle is (as the EU contended) or is not (as the complainant 
countries contended) a part of international law binding on all states.  Though concluding the EU’s use of 
this particular moratorium violated GATT rules, it did not address the legality of future product-specific 
measures the European Union or any other country might adopt in the future.  The Panel also avoided 
stating any conclusions on the question of whether GM foods are substantially similar to their conventional 
counterparts, the position of many in the USA who support less regulation.  Thus the WTO ruling went 
against the European Union on the technicalities of its de facto moratorium, but did not include any ruling 
that would force the EU into a complete revision of the EU regulatory system, though it did indicate that EU 
member states’ maintenance of national bans on GM products the relevant EU institutions had accepted as 
safe were contrary to the SPS agreement. 
 
Consistent with WTO rules, the parties then agreed that the EU should be given a 12-month “Reasonable 
Time Period” to come into compliance, after which complainants could seek permission to apply retaliatory 
measures if the EU were not making progress in bringing its policies into line with the Panel Ruling.  They 
then agreed to extend this another year, until January 2008. 
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The EU and the US are unlikely to adopt similar regulations regarding cultivation of GM plant varieties or 
sale of products containing GM ingredients because public opinion remains more strongly opposed to 
applications of GM technology for several reasons: 
 
1. US firms developing or hoping to develop agricultural applications of GM technologies formed an 
effective nationwide industry lobby despite differences in firm size and main areas of interest early 
in the discussions of GMOs.  European firms developing or hoping to develop agricultural 
applications of GM technology failed to form industry lobbies, particularly at the EU-wide level, 
early in the process and their efforts still lag behind those of US firms.  Thus the European GM 
debate includes fewer advocates of agricultural applications than the US debate. 
 
2. Most GM plant varieties developed so far bred for disease resistance, herbicidal properties, or 
pesticidal properties, and these traits are most useful to farmers engaged in highly mechanized 
cultivation on large fields.  There are more such farmers in the USA than in EU countries. 
 
3. European food sellers typically purchase much of their food from local or regional suppliers rather 
than large transcontinental suppliers.  In the USA most supermarket chains rely on large 
transcontinental suppliers.  Genetic modifications that increase the keeping time or shipping 
hardiness of vegetables, fruit, and other foods are less important to European than to US food 
suppliers. 
 
4. On average, European consumers place higher value on freshness and local varieties of food than 
do US consumers.  GM organisms and plants are perceived by European consumers as highly 
standardized “industrial-style” products lacking character.  There is a growing “buy local” 
movement in the USA but it still accounts for only a small part of US food consumption. 
 
5. Though US regulatory processes in place during the 1980s actually included more opportunity for 
public comment than did the EU or member state processes of the time, the initial decision that GM 
organisms and plants are “substantially similar” to conventionally-bred organisms and plants meant 
that regulatory agencies did not see the need to develop new rules for making decisions about GM 
organisms.  Thus neither Congressional debates nor the public comment process involved in 
agency rule-making occurred at an early stage of technology use.  Because of the economic and 
consumer attitudes differences noted above, agricultural use of GM technology was far less 
widespread in Europe when opposition arose, so it was easier to interrupt approvals and press for 
adoption of more restrictive rules. 
 
6. Multiparty political systems, which exist in most EU member states, make it easier for new groups, 
such as environmentalists, to form political parties and win seats in the national legislature than do 
two-party systems, as exist in the USA and the UK.  The ability of small parties to win seats is 





the legislature are elected from larger multi-member districts and each party wins seats in 
proportion to its share of the vote in the district.  It is easier to “break in” under this system than 
under a single-member district system.  Most European countries have multiparty and proportional 
representation systems, which encourage European environmentalists to put a lot of energy into 
mobilizing ordinary voters.  A two-party system, single-member districts, and greater opportunities 
for influencing policy through lobbying and litigation in the courts encouraged US environmentalist 
groups to put most of their effort into lobbying and litigation.  This difference contributes to the 
higher level of environmental consciousness among the average European votes than the average 
US voter. 
 
7. Similar ethical sentiments prevail among proponents and opponents of agricultural applications of 
GM technology on both sides of the Atlantic.  Anti-GMO views get more traction on food issues in 
Europe because the greater public interest in food quality among Europeans promoted greater 
receptivity to arguments that GM technology modifies foods much more than traditional cross-
breeding and hybridization techniques. 
 
Differences in the way regulation proceeds in the USA and the EU also affect the results.  Even if the two 
sets of regulators converged on a single method of risk analysis, which itself seems difficult given greater 
US reliance on cost-benefit modes of risk analysis and greater European reliance on the precautionary 
principle, the ways each implements regulations inhibits common approaches to risk management through 
regulations.  The parallel existence of regulatory statutes and the US tort law system as well as strongly 
market-oriented economic beliefs encourage regulators to presume things are safe until lack of safety is 
demonstrated.  The more hierarchical traditions of regulation in Europe combined with the relative absence 
of private rights to pursue matters through the courts mean that regulators are more willing to make 
determinations regarding individual products.9 
 
Stalemate in Europe has also been prolonged by the work-in-progress nature of the EU regional integration 
project.  In contrast to the USA, where federal preeminence in regulation of foods, drugs, and chemicals 
(including pesticides) has been established for decades, EU bodies still share authority with member state 
agencies on many issues, including food safety, agriculture, and environmental protection.  Decision-
making at the EU level can be slowed by the rules requiring that the Council adopt Directives, Regulations, 
and some specific regulatory decisions (including approvals of GM varieties of plants for sale or for 
cultivation) by a qualified majority comprising half the total number of member states and about 74% of the 
total votes cast under the weighted voting system.  This has been the case with GM plant varieties, where 
the Commission was unable to get the Council to endorse any proposals to authorize marketing foods 
containing or growing crops of GM plant varieties in 2006-2008.  Throughout that period anti-GM 
sentiments seemed to growing among the member states.  In 2006 Hungary banned growing of many 
varieties approved by the European Food Safety Agency and inhibited cultivation of the few allowed by 
requiring that farmers leave 400-meter (1200 feet) wide isolation zones between fields planted with GM 
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varieties and fields planted with conventionally-bred varieties get all neighbors’ written consent before 
starting cultivation of GM varieties.  Poland banned sale or cultivation of all GM varieties in October 2006, a 
measure the EU Commission formally opposed by suing Poland for non-compliance with EU directives in 
the European Court of Justice.10  The governments of Ireland and France also joined the government of 
Austria in strong opposition to allowing cultivation of GM crops and sale of GM-based products.11  
Meanwhile, the WTO Panel Report inspired additional interaction between the parties.  Argentina and 
Canada let the November 2007 deadline for the EU to comply with the Dispute Settlement Panel’s ruling 
pass without seeking permission to retaliate.  The USA did ask for authorization to retaliate, the EU filed an 
objection, and the two moved into “technical discussions” after starting and then agreeing to a suspension 
of the WTO process for determining whether EU inaction merits retaliatory trade measures.12  Canada 
formally resolved its complaint in an agreement to hold twice-yearly policy consultations with the EU in July 
2009, and Argentina came to a similar agreement in March 2010.13  While clearly disappointed with 
continuing EU stalemate, the complainants understand the contentiousness of the issue and the hazards of 
pressing too hard.  
 
Signs that the stalemate might be ending appeared in early 2010.  In March, after more than three years of 
debate triggered by strong opposition from anti-GMO groups, the Commission approved cultivation of 
Amflora, a starch-rich potato variety developed by the German firm BASF intended for paper manufacturing 
and other industrial uses.  This opened the way for cultivation in Germany, Sweden, and the Czech 
Republic, and was seen as a significant policy development.  In June news reports indicated the 
Commission was circulating drafts of a possible new regulation that would allow member states to ban sale 
of products containing any GM ingredient or cultivation of any GM variety they desire, rather than be 
confined to the human health, animal health, or environmental risk considerations specified in Directive 
1830, in return for not blocking EU-level approval of varieties determined to be safe by the European Food 
Safety Agency.14  In essence, members of the EU would “agree to disagree” on the issue.  Biotechnology 
companies and farmers desiring to grow GM varieties would be able to do so under fairly strict rules 
regarding separation of GM from non-GM crops both in the field and in the food distribution chain if the 
                                                
10 Pollack and Schaffer 2009, 247. 
 
11 “Environment Council: Ministers seek to solve impasse over GMOs.”  2009. European Report 9 June 2009. 
 
12See Europa Press Releases.  2009. EU and Canada settle WTO case on genetically modified organisms.  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1142&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en  
As of May 2010 the EU and the USA had not reached a formal agreement on the dispute.  See EU status notification to the WTO 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146140.pdf (accessed 17 June 2010). 
  
13Europa Press Releases.  2009. EU and Canada settle WTO case on genetically modified organisms.  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1142&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; 
joint Argentina-EU notification of settlement to the WTO available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146144.pdf (accessed 17 June 2010). 
 
14Joshua Chaffin 2010.  Move to allow EU ban on GM crops.  Financial Times 4 June 2010 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6654b40a-






government of their country agreed.  Opponents of GM foods and crops would have to continue supporting 
bans where they existed and campaign country-by-country to secure additional bans. 
 
While the regulatory controversies between the US and the EU and within the EU continued, developers 
and growers of GM plants and food processors using GM-based ingredients both accommodated to and 
created pressures for reduction of the regulatory differences.  US government agencies have explicitly 
decided against adopting labeling requirements, two methods of distinguishing foods from non-GMO 
sources have developed in the USA to appeal to consumers who want to avoid GMOs: a) foods labeled as 
“not containing” a GMO or meat and animal products as coming from animals “not treated with” a GM 
hormone and b) foods labeled “organic” because the USDA standards for using the organic label adopted 
in 2001 exclude use of GM plants, enzymes, or hormones.  Export-oriented grain growers’ associations 
became more sensitive to problems that would arise if they continued to grow varieties allowed in the US 
but not in other countries in summer 2006 when trace amounts of LL601 rice developed by Bayer were 
found in shipments of Clearfield rice shipped abroad and both EU and Japanese authorities required all US 
rice shipments to be tested and certified to be LL601-free before they could be sold in their markets.  
Difficulties for exporters to Europe were compounded in April 2007.  EU Directive 1830 specified limits on 
trace amounts of GM-derived ingredients in foods labeled “GMO-free.”  They could contain no more than 
0.9% of an ingredient derived from a GM product authorized for sale in the EU, and no more than 0.5% of 
an ingredient derived from a GM variety certified as safe by the EFSA but not yet approved for sale by the 
EU Commission for period of three years after the EFSA action.  After three years a zero threshold applied 
to such ingredients.  The zero threshold went into effect on several GM varieties in April 2007, inspiring 
considerable complaint from the US and other exporters to the EU because of the extreme difficulty of 
separating out different varieties of grain in bulk shipment and the continuing stalemate on approval of GM 
varieties in the EU Council. 
 
These and other difficulties that arose when the US permitted cultivation before regulators in importing 
countries authorized sale of that same variety inspired the US Biotechnology Industry Organization to adopt 
self-regulation under which member firms will not commercialize a new GM variety until it is clear the 
variety will be approved for sale in key importing countries.15  Biotechnology companies have also altered 
their development plans in response to consumer preferences.  Several efforts to commercialize varieties 
of rice and wheat initially intended for human consumption have been abandoned.  More effort has been 
devoted to plants used as animal feed or industrial crops (those used in manufacturing or for fuel).  As 
Brian Hindo noted in June 2008 that: 
 
The political battles over genetically modified organisms (GMOs) through the 1990s left the 
company bruised, profitless, and with scaled-back ambitions on the consumer food front. Out were 
promises of GMO wheat, rice, and tomatoes. In was a focus on corn, soy, and cotton – big-volume 
crops destined for industrial uses such as animal feed, ethanol, and textiles. The gambit worked. 
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Since 2003, Monsanto has transformed itself from a money-losing pariah into a $5 billion 
agribusiness titan with 20% profit margins and a stock price that is up 1,200%.16 
 
Promoters of cisgenic methods argue that cisgenic rDNA is far safer because it only uses genetic material 
that is already present in other varieties of the same plant or organism so would not produce strange 
unknown plants if varieties with RDNA were to mix in fields with natural or traditionally-bred varieties.  
Therefore, they argue, regulators do not need to subject it to the restrictive conditions applied to varieties 
developed with transgenic rDNA.  Reducing the regulatory burden, in particular the requirements for 
lengthy field tests, isolation of fields used for GM crops from others, and traceability requirements would 
permit public institutions and smaller enterprises to apply the technology.  This would, in their view, now 
only break the oligopoly of large firms that dominate the market for transgenic varieties, but also permit 
development of greater genetic variety in crops because the smaller firms would not need to focus on large-
volume standardization of seeds as has prevailed in the transgenic field.17  However, others contest claims 
that cisgenic methods are safer, and insist that cisgenic varieties should be regulated with the same 
strictness as transgenic ones.18  
 
These pragmatic adjustments have not stilled the ethical arguments.  However, there are inconsistencies of 
attitude on each side that leave regulators and others wondering whether policies regarding GM products 
and crops are based on safety concerns, ethical concerns, or economic calculations.  When conservatives 
in the USA use calls for “sound science” as battering rams to dismantle government regulations, Europeans 
begin to doubt that the US government and US interest groups are really serious about science-based 
policy assessment.  Those suspicions were fuelled by the US Bioterrorism Act of 2002, which included 
some trade restrictions lacking scientific rationale.19  Conversely, Americans who follow GM developments 
closely know that European firms are the largest producers of GM enzymes in the world, many of which are 
used in production of cheese, beer, and other food products in European countries without controversy or 
special labeling.  They also struggle to understand why Europeans think GM technology is so bad when 
they accept radioactive irradiation as a method of altering genetic material for plant breeding purposes.20 
 
The passage of time has brought some lessening of uncertainty about the characteristics of GM organisms.  
Some have now been grown for 20 years or more without becoming “frankenfoods” or posing serious harm 
to their animal or human eaters.  Many government regulators are converging on a more nuanced 
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17 See Cisgenesis.com 2010.  “Faster and cheaper approval needed for safe, genetically modified crops without foreign genes 
(cisgenic crops)” available at http://www.cisgenesis.com/content/view/4/28/lang,english/ (accessed 18 June 2010) 
 
18 See the section on Cisgenic Organisms in Institute of Science in Society (ISIS).  2007.  “’Self-cloned’ wine yeasts not 
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Available at http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/us_bio_act_prel_com_en.pdf (accessed June 2010). 
 






approach based on understanding that the environmental impacts of GM crops depend on the traits being 
developed and the particular ecosystems into which they will be introduced.  In this view neither blanket 
opposition to GM technology nor blanket approval is an appropriate attitude; GM organisms must be 
considered case-by-case.  As uncertainty about effects declines with experience, the warrant for citing 
uncertainty about its effects as reason to ban GM technology weakens, particularly in the eyes of actors 
who see successful activity elsewhere and would like to engage in it at home.  However, some hold out.  In 
April 2007 EU Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas maintained that GMO products "raise a whole 
new series of possible risks to the environment, notably potential longer-term effects that could impact on 
biodiversity.  Protected sites or areas, endangered or vulnerable species of plants and animals are of 
paramount importance in this respect."  He dismissed Food Safety Agency (EFSA) assessments because 
"scientific opinions rendered by EFSA have relied exclusively on information provided by companies that 
look at short-term effects," meaning "EFSA cannot give a sound scientific opinion on long-term effects of 
GMOs."21 
 
Since plants have been subject to human modification for millennia, the ethical arguments for opposing GM 
technology as interferences with nature or the divine order are far weaker and have less support than 
similar arguments against application of GM technology to animal or human genetic material – as 
suggested by the lack of a “plant rights” movement paralleling the animal rights movement.  Opponents of 
GM as a method of plant breeding continue to maintain their other objections – the uncertainty surrounding 
long term effects, and the ethical objections that GM technology facilitates domination of food supplies by a 
small group of private companies, that it worsens gaps between wealthier and poorer farmers, and that it 
contributes to the further impoverishment of developing countries.  The Austrian government added a new 
ethical claim to the European mix in April 2007 by arguing that EU rules helping consumers maintain 
freedom of choice by requiring GMO-containing products be labeled, should have an analog protecting a 
farmer’s right to avoid growing GM plants through regulations assuring good isolation of fields sown with 
GM crops.22  In the end, there has been too little ethical consensus to maintain a bright line preventing 
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22 Also noted in EurActiv Network 2007. 
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